

SUMMARY REPORT
OF THE
OVERSEAS REINVENTION IMPACT REVIEW

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
ASIA/NEAR EAST
AFRICA

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The ORIR teams would like to express their appreciation to the many Agency personnel, both overseas and in Washington, who gave generously of their time and went out of their way to accommodate and cooperate with the teams as they conducted this assessment.

The collective team believes that the information contained in this report captures valuable field insight on, and will help insure the success of, the Agency's reengineering process.

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- A. Study Proposal
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose: The purpose of the Overseas Reinvention Impact Review (ORIR) was to assess the impact of planned Agency reengineering and reform on the effectiveness and efficiency of current mission operations, on organizational structure, and on human resources.

B. Background: The Administrator and the Assistant Administrator for Management requested a study to be performed because the Agency's reengineering and reinvention efforts had reached a point where it was crucial to factor in input from a cross-section of Agency field operations. The Overseas Reinvention Impact Review was undertaken to meet this objective in accordance with the attached study proposal and operational plan (see Attachments A and B).

C. Methodology: The ORIR was coordinated by the Director, Office of Management Planning and Innovation (M/MPI) and, in large part, carried out by three teams each led by a senior member of the M/MPI staff. The teams were interdisciplinary, composed of USAID/W based staff from the Bureau for Management, the Regional Bureaus, the Global Bureau and Bureau for Humanitarian Response (see Attachment C for team composition).

Each team was assigned a geographic region to assess: Latin America/Caribbean (LAC), Africa (AFR), and Asia/Near East (ANE). An additional assessment of overseas disaster relief organizations was conducted from USAID/W by the Director, M/MPI. The assessment sites visited by the teams were chosen, in collaboration with the regional bureaus, using the M Bureau Mission Workforce Model as a departure point, wherein USAID posts are categorized according to type and complexity of country-specific project portfolios. The sites included in the ORIR are representative of normal and traditional USAID missions' business functions and practices in a cross-section of Agency field operations: large development programs, small development programs, political/security programs, regional support missions, experimental missions, disaster relief programs, and special initiatives programs. Countries or programs included in the ORIR were:

Latin America and the Caribbean: Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Panama and El Salvador;

Africa: Senegal¹, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and REDSO/ESA for support provided the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative;

¹Also an experimental mission focussing on strategic objective teams.

Asia and the Near East: Bangladesh², Thailand, Cambodia and Jordan; and

Overseas Disaster Relief: Zaire, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia.

NOTE: The Europe/New Independent States region was not included in the study due to the different and unique processes and authorities under which it operates, although a limited interview was conducted with one of DAAs of the ENI Bureau.

The three ORIR teams conducted regional visits between October 17, 1994 and January 31, 1995. Each team provided a briefing for selected field organizations with the latest information and current status on the Agency's reform efforts and proposed changes reengineering will bring when fully implemented. Also, the teams provided reinvention videos and available reengineering documents at each field site, as needed. The LAC field survey was conducted prior to the other two and, to some extent, served as the pilot assessment. Based on LAC Bureau findings, the approach and survey instrument were refined and modified before the AFR and ANE reviews took place.

As the primary tool for data gathering, a questionnaire was employed to guide individual interviews with all available USDH, USPSCs, and key FSNPSCs and FNDHs (see Attachment D). Through this survey instrument, the teams sought to capture detailed information regarding (1) current operations, (2) how reengineering would affect field operations, including human resources and organizational structure, and (3) specific concerns of which the Agency should be cognizant as reengineered systems and procedures are developed and finalized. The questions were provided to field sites in advance of the teams' arrivals along with general information about the reengineered procurement, budget, accounting and operations business systems.

Supplementary to individual interviews, a variety of group discussions and meetings were held, as well as entry and exit briefings with the USAID principal officer at each post. Data gathered was consolidated at the end of each country visit and prior to beginning the next country assessment.

This report, prepared by the Office of Management Planning and Innovation (M/MPI), is a summation of the key observations and findings of the three study teams. The data collected by the teams was analyzed and conclusions and recommendations drawn as warranted by the information available.

²Also an experimental mission focussing on democracy.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The ORIR teams' findings verified certain assumptions as to why the Agency needed to reengineer its basic business functions: the existence of too much paperwork and reporting, too many regulations and controls, and a lack of confidence that any creativity would be rewarded. Findings also reinforced the conclusion that USAID has been concentrating on its processes instead of focussing on the results of its development work.

While uneven, there is a generally high level of acceptance in the field for the proposed reengineering reforms as well as enthusiasm about the potential for positive change. Experimental missions, which now have experience working with portions of the reengineered systems, have a particularly heightened appreciation for the reforms and certainly a more comprehensive understanding of the Agency's new direction than that which exists in the missions without benefit of hands-on experience.

Without doubt, the manner in which USAID managers plan and conduct work in the field will be substantially affected by reengineering. Where the understanding of the concepts and reforms was greater, field staff were more open and accepting of the changes and challenges ahead. However, there are communication problems which impede the staff's ability to understand and comprehend the reengineered systems and processes and to accurately identify the effects on mission operations. Reliable, user-friendly information that provides both the details and the big picture of reengineering is critical to the speed and level of success of this endeavor. Further, it is essential that the field not continue to receive direction from the regional bureaus or other USAID/W offices which is, or gives the appearance of being contrary to reengineering goals and values. Communications appear to be, in general, incomplete and inconsistent.

There is no specific recommendation in this report regarding the internal organization of missions. Uneven levels of understanding regarding upcoming changes, as well as the lack of real experience with implementation, precluded such a recommendation. However, it was possible to distinguish some changes inevitable with the advent of strategic objective teams. The lines separating elements in a traditional organization structure will become blurred as teams reach across those lines to identify expertise needed. This eventually may lead to widespread organizational restructuring. And while the teams found no basis for shifting functions between field entities and USAID/W, experience working within the reengineered systems and with the corporate data base may lead, in time, to some functional shifts from the field to Washington.

No justification was found to support the continuation of separate field organizational titles, i.e, Missions, Office of USAID Representatives and USAID Affairs Offices. While the sizes of the various organizations differ, both in staffing and

program terms, the complexity of the responsibilities and level of accountability of the managers does not substantially vary. While smaller posts tend to depend on other organizations such as regional services organizations for specific services, this does not lessen the accountability of the mission director serviced.

The teams concluded that regional support services provided to small posts by larger, appropriately staffed and delegated missions, was a feasible and valid mode of operation. However, support provided by regional services organizations is sometimes not structured sufficiently or well understood by all parties and requires a formalized scheduling process in order to meet current and future demands. There is a continuing, multi-purpose role for regional services organizations within the reengineering framework. The concepts of a corporate data system and virtual team membership should result in less travel from regional services organizations, in turn, making for more efficient staff utilization.

Many who were interviewed felt that working in teams with our customers might increase the amount of time needed in the planning stages of the development process. That being said, it is not clear that, in arriving at these perceptions, mission staff have fully considered the total time involved in our current processes in getting analytical teams on the ground in and producing their reports. If this time-consuming process were built into the equation, the time required to build consensus with our partners and customers would not seem so lengthy in comparison. Clarity of roles among the participants in team structures should maximize efficiency in these circumstances. While desirable under any operating structure, such clarification will be critical in the reengineering context as we struggle with a changing culture as well as changing processes. This need applies among staff members, organizations, and teams as well as between Washington and overseas. It also applies to disaster relief interventions in countries where several USAID organizational units can have legitimate, but potentially overlapping, roles.

Reengineering will require changes in skills emphasis as well as in levels of staffing. Examples of occupations that will be significantly affected are voucher examiner, accountant, financial analysts, project development officers, systems analysts, program/administrative assistants and secretaries. Clearly, some staffing reductions will be possible in selected skills categories, but the total number is not definable at this time. At the same time, the different skills required to work within the reengineering context lead many field staff to believe that the total staffing levels might remain relatively constant.

Working within the team construct will require mission staff to have a greater appreciation and understanding of a variety of basic skills and disciplines. This is seen as a positive change which could result in each employee developing multiple skills. Such development would allow greater assignment flexibility over the long term, benefitting both Agency management and individuals. The teams believe that this

logically leads to a redefinition of the Agency's occupational (backstop) categories into as few as four broad bands: technical, administrative, program management and financial.

The role of the FSN staff (direct hire and PSC) will be enhanced by the reengineered systems and processes and the FSNs can serve as a key element in insuring the success of the reengineering effort. While basic FSN authority and compensation questions remain to be resolved, the FSN staff constitutes a sizable, generally highly educated and competent resource base eager for more authority and responsibility. Experience in the experimental missions visited, reveals the positive benefits USAID can reap by making more productive use of the FSN staff. FSNs are also, dollar for dollar, the least expensive component of the overseas workforce and a resource which the Agency should increasingly turn to in carrying out its work more economically.

Adequate and appropriate training is one of the most critical prerequisites to successful reengineering. Experimental missions have been, and will continue to be, provided a variety of training to give them every chance of succeeding in their efforts. The same now must be done on a much broader basis. The field's expressed need for training was pervasive -- training to operate more effectively in the current operating climate as well as enabling staff to work with reengineered systems and procedures. Training to meet reengineering needs will be required in technical skills, automation, specific business area applications, and language skills. Additional training must be available to facilitate the cultural changes which reengineering will bring. Lastly, training in fundamental operating skills, which appear to have been neglected, is required to bring employees to a level where they are able to fulfill their potential.

III. OVERVIEW - FIELD RECEPTIVITY TO CHANGE

The majority of the USAID staff interviewed welcomed the reengineering effort and felt that the changes would result in greater staff efficiency and improve development performance results.

Overwhelmingly, field staff recognized the positive potential of reengineering and many were quick to point out actions taken, or shifts in operations already in place which are supportive of Agency reform and reengineering principles. If staff are truly empowered with the authorities, tools and resources to do their jobs, many stated that they would welcome the responsibility and accountability that comes with such empowerment. The field staff recognizes, however, that the Agency's business culture must change, and that will take time. Fundamental cultural change is necessary to build an environment supportive of risk taking, shared responsibility within the team context, and managing for results.

Many field staff are comfortable with an operating system that requires clearly stated, results-oriented objectives and goals as the starting point for determining what the appropriate development interventions should be and how the outcomes of those interventions will be measured. They believe that having such a results framework would likely improve the working environment within the mission because all interested parties will be committed to reaching a clearly articulated and agreed upon goal.

Working in teams organized around strategic objectives is envisioned as a marked enhancement of program operating procedure in the long run. However, the formation of teams is seen by many as much more time-consuming in the initial planning stages as the team attempts to build consensus -- even more so when customers and partners become members of the teams. Nevertheless, it is apparent to many staff that the ultimate result will be a somewhat shorter overall timeframe for development results delivery, increased time for technical work and networking with development partners, and ultimately, an improved end product. The limits and boundaries of team organization and responsibility, however, engendered much discussion and comment and need to be clearly stated at the onset.

Most employees believe that reengineering will create clearer lines of authority, improve communications, increase efficiency and allow people to devote more time to the business of development and related analytical tasks. For some, it will mean less time-consuming paperwork and more time for site visits, customer contact, and focus on the achievement of performance results.

Expectations that enormous amounts of data and information will become available as a result of the introduction of the new suite of corporate data systems precipitated questions about the field's ability to properly manage it. In addition, while most staff agreed that having more information will benefit them by saving time and increasing their ability to share lessons learned with their counterparts, they strongly felt that Washington's access to additional data may result in increased, not decreased, demands. If that occurs, the net result may be no real savings in responding to information requests. The ability to adapt to, and deal with, the transparency created by this sharing of information is part of the culture change USAID will experience.

From the field's perspective, the reengineered systems should:

- have built-in flexibilities, checks and balances to deal with changes as they occur and insure that the electronic in-box is faster than the paper one;
- reduce regulations and red tape;
- provide more time to do analytical work associated with planning, monitoring and evaluation;

- get Washington out of micromanaging the work in the field;
- provide better access to technical resources; and
- reduce the need for excessive overtime.

What proved difficult for many to envision is how empowerment and accountability will mesh with the emphasis on teamwork in relation to structure, personnel evaluations, incentives and rewards. Regardless, it is generally felt that empowerment provides an increased sense of ownership and pride. This is keenly felt by those FSNs who have already been given more authority, and is echoed by USDH staff.

While critical of many details regarding the new business systems and concerned about implementation, the new suite of corporate data systems were almost universally welcomed. The introduction of new business practices and procedures in the program and project development area generated more guarded optimism, but the need for change in how we do business was accepted, for the most part, as a necessary and evolutionary step by the Agency. Teams found that a number of missions were already working within a defined set of strategic objectives and that the larger missions had formed strategic objective teams, albeit not necessarily defined precisely as prescribed by the Operations Business Area Analysis.

Some skepticism was expressed about the timing of installation of the new systems in the field. The August/September period was not considered by many to be a good time because the missions will be too focussed on end-of-fiscal year activities. Additionally, the controllers expressed concern about the significant increase in workload which will be required to run parallel systems. Field staff encouraged early testing and debugging of all new automation applications and systems to make this implementation period as short as possible and further iterated that the systems should be adequately tested before implementation in the field, because experience with implementing previous systems proved to be very time-consuming due to system glitches.

In general, field staff are concerned about the entire implementation process: training, timing, cutover, etc., perhaps because little information was available about this phase of reengineering. Still, they realize that many of their concerns will dissipate as more is known and understood about the process.

IV. HUMAN RESOURCES

A. Skills Needs

The study teams sought the field staff perspective on skills important to the Agency in working with the reengineered systems and those skills that the Agency should emphasize in future recruitment efforts. The respondents felt that the skills currently emphasized when recruiting staff remain relevant: college level training in the field of specialization; good communication, managerial and leadership skills; planning, monitoring and analytical skills; and appropriate language capabilities. In addition, they felt that working in the reengineered Agency will require greater computer literacy, good interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity, personal risk taking and team building. A number of field staff also saw a distinct benefit to hiring candidates with prior USAID or other related overseas experience. One point made very clear regarding recruitment was that if the Agency hires technical people, it should be to perform technical work. Technical personnel, hired for their technical skills, should not be forced by the system to move into generalist/managerial roles in order to advance in their careers.

Field staff also felt that for reengineering to succeed, modifications in the personnel assignment and evaluation processes, and incentives and rewards systems must be adopted. A large part of encouraging cultural shifts is providing a personnel framework which will foster change and reward behaviors that reflect reengineering principles and goals. Rewards which focus on emphasizing teamwork, empowerment and managing for results must be developed. Recognition, based solely on individual accomplishment must be de-emphasized.

Both employees and supervisors repeatedly advised that the skills and potential of many staff members are not now fully utilized by the Agency; many individuals stated that they were capable of doing more, and different, types of work. The Agency should tap this unmined resource, whenever possible, to meet new needs identified as a result of reengineering. In this regard, the assignment system must provide the employees that field units require to implement programs in the reformed and reengineered operating environment. This also implies the development of rules or guidance about managing rotating team membership and fluctuations in team membership and participation.

The Agency should explore the feasibility of defining occupational categories in broader terms, and placing employees into larger and more general professional categories, i.e., broad banding. This would promote the cross-training and professional cross-fertilization essential in a reengineered Agency and which is further discussed in Section VI of this report. It will also increase employees assignment options, allow development in specialties within a category without sidelining or limiting individuals, and support reengineering goals by allowing employees to realize more fully the potential embodied in the concept of empowerment. The team believes the Agency can provide maximum flexibility within its defined occupational categories, by establishing as few as four professional categories: administrative, financial, technical, and program management.

In several missions there is good specific understanding of the technical requirements associated with the new suite of corporate data systems that enable and enhance many of the reforms. Unfortunately, this understanding was found only at relatively low levels in the missions. Systems managers, and a few other employees involved in the budget planning process and the submission of automation section of the Budget Planning Document, are aware of the basic LAN configuration requirements and the hardware and software necessary to implement the new systems. Mission managers are not focussed on these requirements and are making related decisions regarding, for instance, automation support staffing that will impact directly on the ability of posts to train and support their employees in the new operating environment.

As discussed in Section VIII of this report, there is wide-spread concern about the integrity of data entered at the source by personnel who are largely non-financial. Controllers' offices see new roles emerging as trainers and troubleshooters for AWACS -- roles that could be played by the individuals now performing project accountant functions.

B. Workforce Modalities

Overall, field staff indicated that reengineering will have more of an impact on the content of jobs than on the total number of staff. Generally, employees did not see reduction or elimination of technical positions, but a realignment of duties away from too much time spent on cumbersome control-oriented processes and toward more time on technical input into development results. There was a wide degree of consensus that any time saved would be needed in other areas, such as in a more intensive focus on the partnering and managing for performance results.

Within existing and anticipated resource constraints, i.e., money and people, which are not likely to be relaxed, the study teams' findings would support a shift to more extensive use of FSNPSCs to maximize the Agency's field effectiveness and efficiency. The manner and extent to which FSNs are utilized by USAID was a recurring theme during the interviews. Even though the utilization of foreign national employees has been discussed on many occasions and in many venues, further tapping the potential of talented and experienced local staff remains a valid and unresolved issue for Agency management. If locally-recruited employees can play a larger role and can contribute more fully to Agency objectives than they now do, it is incumbent upon USAID to identify and utilize these employees appropriately. If only one foreign national employee in each mission were to assume duties and responsibilities now discharged by a USPSC or a USDH, the projected savings would be significant.

Both Americans and foreign nationals cited instances where FSNs could assume additional duties and responsibilities. The current level of authority allowed

FSNs in the missions visited, appears to stem primarily from adherence to the traditional and accepted manner of organizing a hierarchical mission structure -- a structure repeatedly questioned. There has been little need or incentive for mission managers to systematically and conscientiously maximize the use of foreign national staff because, as a matter of policy, USDH, USPSC and TCN employees have been identified to fill senior, responsible field positions. The full range of FSN authorities should be reviewed to determine where it is feasible, desirable and legal to increase those authorities. This is equally important to the success of reengineering and the Agency's goal of sustainable development. The FSNs have a vested interest in our programs ultimately benefitting the people of their own countries, and they are proud of the role they serve in reaching that objective. They also retain the historical perspective on the USAID work in country. In many cases, their levels of responsibility could and should be increased as we prepare them to contribute to the objective of their home country institutions becoming self-sustaining.

As the Agency moves away from strictly a hierarchical structure to a team orientation, reengineering is expected to provide more varied positions with broader responsibility to qualified FSNs. Correspondingly, appropriate compensation for FSNs should be available. The foreign national compensation plans developed in each country were the subject of frequent criticism. Many FSNs currently are being asked to perform, and are performing, work outside their official job descriptions -- classification, as well as compensation, is lagging behind. Review, negotiation and possibly legislative action will be required to accomplish appropriate compensation; but, it is clear that the current classification structure must be overhauled. It is too rigid and does not reflect the underlying principals of reengineering.

The use of USPSCs engendered considerable discussion and it is apparent that this type of resource is utilized most often when there is need for specific expertise in a particular area and/or when FTE, policy, funding or time constraints dictate that the use of direct-hire American workforce is not feasible. Also, the employment of USPSCs is frequently a reaction to the inability of USAID/W to supply needed personnel in a timely manner. This is a serious issue that must be addressed. USPSCs constitute a shadow workforce which, over time, has become an accepted and necessary way of meeting staffing requirements. Some field staff expressed concern that existing Agency policy guidance on funding sources for PSCs is not being followed. It is incumbent on the post to adhere to the guidelines.

The Office of Human Resources (M/HR) has the responsibility for recruiting and hiring appropriate human resource skills for the Agency. Since PSCs are a significant part of the Agency's human resource base, responsibility for projecting the need for, and recruiting PSCs should reside with M/HR. However, this function should be appropriately charged to that office providing the recruitment and hiring process can proceed as quickly and efficiently as the current contract processes necessary to engage the services of an expert technician. The BAA for Human Resources team

should be encouraged to address this issue and to develop recruitment strategies to allow the Agency to obtain needed skills for both short and long term needs, in a timely manner. For example, the enhanced use of limited non-career federal appointments has been mentioned as one potentially effective employment mechanism.

The lack of standards for determining appropriate organizational structures for disaster relief programs somewhat hinders identifying workforce needs. However, when such standards are established, they are not anticipated to drastically change the workforce modalities currently used in disaster response. The kinds of staff employed is less of an issue than the question of when they are used and by which bureau's authority, as discussed in Section V of this report. For example, since an emergency situation developed in one country approximately two years ago, the Bureau for Humanitarian Response's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (BHR/OFDA) has had DART teams placed in an adjoining, more secure country, to manage the emergency effort. There was no regular regional bureau staff presence in the country due to security problems and inability to reach the troubled area except from the country out of which the DART teams work. There is a P.L. 480 Title II program under way for the emergency country and, at this point, no one on the ground to monitor it. Further complicating this matter is the presence of an Office of Transition Initiatives (BHR/OTI) team also operating a program for the emergency country out of the neighboring country. The BHR/OTI group began its operations later than was planned and as a result is now running their program at the same time that the regional bureau has begun a transitional development program. BHR/OTI is giving small grants to some of the same beneficiaries as the regional bureau is providing grants to, but on a larger scale. If and when the situation permits, the regional bureau expects to place a regular development staff in country. Yet, because the DART team has been in place for an extended period of time, it has found itself in a position of dealing with the Embassy and the local government on matters relating to longer term development considerations, a situation which is of concern to the regional bureau.

In this instance, there are USDH and contractors involved but, clearly, the problems are primarily coordinative in nature. There are appropriate roles for each and, for the most part, they are in those roles now. It has been suggested that, whenever possible, DART teams should include a direct-hire member from the appropriate regional bureau to provide continuity into the next stages of USAID involvement. Additionally, once a disaster is deemed to be complex and long-term, a regional bureau USDH should be placed in country to manage the continuing effort.

If Agency top management is serious about the Agency's mission being "preventive diplomacy", then attention must be given to developing a cadre of officers skilled in the area of emergency program management. At this stage, there are very few officers who possess these skills and experience.

C. Workforce Numbers

It was acknowledged by field staff that the introduction of the new suite of integrated corporate data systems and the streamlining of processes and systems will result in economies of operation. One result that is expected is a time savings that will allow missions to either reallocate employees' time to more productive areas or to organize responsibilities so that redundant positions can be identified and eliminated. However, given that the economies of operation will vary by function and by work unit, it is difficult to measure the total extent of such economies with accuracy. The specific workforce implications will be more accurately quantifiable after we have had some experience in working with the new systems. In general, it is apparent to overseas staff that a significant number of positions will become redundant when the new systems are operational:

- Controller personnel were almost unanimous in their view that AWACS will eliminate 50 to 70 percent of the project accountant's current work. With accounting transactions entered at their source, advices of charge posted directly to mission accounting systems, and many reporting requirements eliminated, the project accountant will be left with far fewer duties.

- The voucher examiners' work could also decrease by approximately 50% with the electronic matching of contracts, vouchers and receiving reports.

- With the introduction of more sophisticated automation hardware and software, including automated forms and electronic signatures, some believe fewer C&R staff will be needed.

At the same time, it is assumed that Agency management may elect to utilize savings by retraining employees in certain positions to perform new tasks required as a result of reengineering. As an example, staff identified a need for fewer secretaries but an increased need for program/administrative assistants to deal with increased data entry/retrieval. Another example is that, while many feel the project development officer function will disappear, PDO analytical skills in combination with program officer skills will still be needed on the teams. This development would not be inconsistent with the additional suggestion that the size of program offices might be reduced overall specifically due to reporting efficiencies brought about by reengineering.

Positions that field staff see an increasing need for follow:

- Contracting officers indicated that there will be a significant increase in their workload and, even though bringing procurement staff into the process at an earlier stage would be an improvement, additional contracting officers might be required.

- The controllers projected a greater need for financial analysts since a financial analysis capability will be required on the results package teams as well as to work more closely with indigenous implementors and host governments to monitor and help strengthen financial systems.

- Information/data management specialists will be needed to manage and coordinate the influx of information and data provided by the suite of corporate data systems and reengineered processes.

- Systems analysts will be needed to support the hardware/software complexities of the new systems.

- Staff will be needed who have experience with performance results monitoring and evaluation.

- Staff will be needed with skills in emergency program management.

As each post represents a unique and individual operating environment, the new suite of integrated systems will also have varying degrees of impact. However, it is apparent that some reforms will have significant workforce implications, particularly in areas where large numbers of employees are engaged in routine data entry. To rationalize personnel retasking and position reductions, mission directors should be tasked in the future with assessing impacts. Making each mission director responsible for the appropriate utilization of both financial and human resources under the new operating systems is consistent with the traditional mandate given principal USAID officers in the field, and consistent with the initiative to increasingly give responsibility and authority to those closest to the development activity.

Recommendations:

1. The BAA team for Human Resources should revamp the incentives, rewards, assignment and evaluation systems before October 1, 1995, to reflect the new team-oriented work style and managing for results.

2. At an appropriate point after implementation of the reengineered processes, M/HR should take the lead in collaborating with regional bureaus in verifying and quantifying the need for fewer secretaries, voucher examiners, accountants, C&R staff and PDOs. They should also verify and quantify the need for additional program/administrative assistants, financial analysts, data/information management specialists, systems analysts, performance results monitoring and evaluation specialists and contract officers as a result of reengineering.

3. The BAA team for Human Resources should review FSN authorities and compensation regulations to determine where increases are feasible, desirable and

legal.

4. As part of the annual budget process, the Office of Budget (M/B) should require each mission director to review staffing resources and certify that each USDH and USPSC position must be encumbered by an American.

5. Mission directors should be required to identify foreign national employees with the ability and potential to undertake more responsibility; to establish career ladder positions and identify training opportunities to enhance career development of FSNs.

6. M/HR should integrate the additional skills that will be required to function in the reengineered Agency into selection criteria for new hires.

7. The BAA team for Human Resources should address those barriers/constraints in the Agency's direct hire recruitment/assignment process that cause managers to resort to use of USPSC resources.

8. Following implementation of the reengineered systems, each mission should reassess the role of voucher examiners and project accountants and determine the appropriate mix of skills required in the controller's offices if they are to effectively interface with strategic objective teams.

9. If an BHR/OFDA representative(s) has been placed in a country, without normal mission presence, to manage an emergency effort, after three to six months, BHR and the regional bureau should jointly review , the status of the disaster situation to determine if the need for disaster management will continue for a prolonged period of time. If it is determined that the need will be continuing, the appropriate regional bureau should assign a direct-hire bureau officer to manage the longer term effort, with appropriate support from BHR/OFDA. The senior USAID officer should be selected through the SMG process.

10. A regional bureau representative should be assigned as a member of the disaster DART teams whenever possible.

11. M/HR should revise promotion/assignment precepts to insure that USAID direct-hire officers do not continue to view assignments to disaster programs, whether in the field or in Washington, as being detrimental to their long-term career interests, as is currently the case.

12. Given the Agency's mission in "preventive diplomacy", M/HR should take those steps necessary to put in place a cadre of officers skilled in emergency program management.

13. To insure mission directors are clear with regard to resource requirements

needed, the Office of Information Resources Management (M/IRM) should communicate very clearly and directly to USAID principal officers what will be required in each field mission under ISP (LANS and PC configuration), what M/IRM is doing now to prepare the missions (planning and procurement), and what steps can now be taken in the field to prepare for the changes (introduce Windows,etc.).

V. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT OF REENGINEERING

There was a general consensus that reengineering would result in a far less hierarchical arrangement than we have today, but there was no consensus on any one specific structure for organizing our field organizations. The most often suggested structure was that missions and technical offices be organized along strategic objectives, and staff offices along functional lines, with some staff office consolidation possible. Generally, the missions believe they are effectively structured for reengineering, in part, because many already have established permanent or temporary teams organized around strategic objectives. They feel that the reengineering process will strengthen that organizational paradigm. With this type of structure and the reengineering emphasis on empowerment, the field does expect more authority to be delegated to missions.

A. Mission Organizational Structures

Field staff felt that the changes envisioned in the manner in which USAID programs are designed, implemented and evaluated would eventually produce the need for less hierarchy and create a more porous structure with less rigid lines between offices, i.e., at least a partial breakdown of traditional mission organizational structure. This, in turn, would result in more integration and collaboration across office lines. If a less rigid organization structure evolves as expected, the need for clearly defined, non-overlapping roles among the staff officers is a necessity. Lack of clarification, and overlapping roles and authorities among the staff members and the various involved organizations, e.g., controllers/contracting officers/project managers, or regional bureaus/Global/Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC), causes concern now and must be resolved. Clarity will continue to be critical under the reengineered operating system, when roles within an overall team approach must be clearly defined and understood.

The study teams received several suggestions regarding functions which might be consolidated. Integration of the program and project development functions was considered a viable option, and largely, it has already taken place -- formally or informally -- in a number of missions. Likewise, certain technical offices or occupations, such as food for peace and agriculture, might be combined. Combining such offices should promote greater efficiency in operations, broaden the professional work experience of employees, and allow a streamlining of functions so that staffing redundancies might be eliminated.

No major changes were identified in the mix of functional responsibilities between Washington, regional services organizations and field missions which is thought, generally, to be appropriate. If there was a predominant view of a need to change where specific work was accomplished, it was that Washington should establish broad policy, strategic guidance, and resource allocations and approve country development strategies, objectives and results and for impact level evaluations at a regional, sub-regional or sectoral level. The field should receive delegations to: develop country development strategies, objectives and results, design and implement appropriate program interventions, manage programs and monitor country level results, and reallocate resources internally consistent with performance results.

There was considerable sentiment among the field staff that coordination between Washington and the field is more important than where the responsibilities are placed, suggesting an awareness that continuous change and adjustment will occur as reengineering is implemented and savings become increasingly evident. However, no matter where actions occur, there was general agreement that fewer, clearer and more flexible regulations and directives would simplify matters greatly.

B. Impact of Teamwork and Customer Participation

The field staff saw the Agency's emphasis on a team approach, including customers and partners, leading to better development results. This approach will enable the Agency to utilize the diverse skills and resources that each individual and organization brings to the achievement of our goals and objectives. It will also help to insure that the real needs of the end-users are identified, increase productivity and result in a better internal flow of work through the mission.

While the concept of customer involvement is still a source of some confusion to the field, almost without exception, the inclusion of customers and partners on teams was seen as the best way to work -- even if not always the most efficient. Field concerns/comments regarding the teamwork concept follow:

- There was concern that external customers/partners might have a different agenda from that of USAID and that some participants might be in direct competition with each other.
- The team approach will generally delay early stages of the process, increase numbers and duration of meetings and slow the decision process, requiring Washington to rethink timing and deadlines on certain processes. It is not clear that, in arriving at these perceptions, Mission staff have fully considered the total elapsed time involved, in our current processes in getting analytical teams on the ground and producing their reports. If this time-consuming process were built into the equation, the time required to build consensus with our partners and customers would not seem so lengthy in

comparison.

■ The culture or political sensitivities in some countries could make it difficult for host country officials to work hand-in-hand with end users to solve problems, or to allow USAID to bypass the host country officials, where circumstances dictate, and deal directly with customers.

■ Clear, simple procurement integrity guidance regarding future procurement actions with the involvement of customers/partners on teams is needed.

■ Implementing virtual team membership might be difficult and slow down decision making and implementation due to inadequate or incompatible communications technology among countries and organizations.

■ The need to have host governments buy into reengineering was frequently mentioned since many governments are organized around project concepts rather than objectives and results and will probably need to make changes to facilitate the effective implementation of the new concepts. This being the case, local government officers should be brought into the reengineering process as soon as possible.

■ There may be problems with adequate time allocation of team members especially with the prospective need of staff members to serve on multiple teams. Moreover, there are continuity issues related to length-of-tour considerations.

■ USAID will have to learn the art of consensus building, a skill that USAID has not traditionally fostered.

■ The Agency will be challenged to stay focussed and still be viewed as participatory by all its customers.

■ The personnel assignment, promotions and rewards systems must be linked to the achievement of work through teams, not individual achievement and leadership which is currently the case.

■ Once team consensus is reached, the chances for sustainable development results and a superior, more responsive development intervention are enhanced.

■ Field staff and partners feel an increased sense of ownership and pride in the work accomplished.

- Programs will not be designed in a vacuum. Teams will have the ability to facilitate problem solving and provide built-in reality checks.
- There will be increased clarity of expectations up front and an improved ability to anticipate realities of expectations versus resource availability.
- USAID and its partners will be more transparent through increased information sharing, communications, and a revised focus on results.

Many of those interviewed stated that it is incumbent on the Agency to convince its customers and partners of our intent by our actions. USAID will be empowering, decentralizing and becoming more transparent which, in large part, is what we ask of host country governments.

C. Regional Support Structures

In assessing the overall organizational soundness of our field sites, the teams focussed on the presence of adequate management accountability and any anomalies in distribution of work among the various workforce categories. One of the most frequently heard comments was that the Agency has too many controls. While some accountability problems were identified, they were largely mission-specific; mission management was aware of them, and they did not appear to be inherent in the field organization structure. The possible exception might be regional services organizations whose mandates are no longer clear. They serve a primary support function and, increasingly, have their own projects to manage which provides the potential for management oversight problems and conflicting priorities. They are called upon also to have a substantive, and not always temporary, role in disaster situations.

In addition to regional services organizations, several large missions provide some type of support services to neighboring posts, which tend to be small country programs without totally rounded staff resources. There is considerable variance among regional services organizations in the sufficiency, frequency and variety of support provided to client posts. Not surprisingly, the perception of the overall adequacy of the support provided often varied in the views both of the provider and recipient. Regional services organizations approach workload and scheduling differently, running the gamut from proactive to reactive. Expectations for the provision of support services should be clearly articulated by USAID/W, and the required services should be delineated through a formal agreement jointly developed between the service center and the serviced posts. The types and frequency of services should be agreed upon by the parties concerned so that misunderstandings can be eliminated and realistic planning can be done. The scheduling conferences utilized by the Africa Bureau REDSO organizations is one model for programming regional support services.

Regional service posts, with access to the full suite of new corporate data systems, may well find the type of services they provide as well as the amount of time devoted to such support changing. Currently, frequent travel is involved in providing service to client missions. Reengineering will emphasize the use of virtual team members resulting in increased assistance being provided electronically. The degree of change will be directly related to the degree to which client posts can interact with the service provider on an electronic basis. This should reduce the amount of travel necessary and increase the cost efficiency of services provided. Regional support should be reevaluated after the new automated applications have been fully activated and sufficient experience has been gained to allow an assessment of their impact.

Special attention needs to be given to the application of the reengineering principles and processes to special programs which may be regional or multi-country in nature such as the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. Such initiatives are best managed either from a regional overseas organization or from the regional bureau in Washington.

D. Overseas Organizational Designations

The study team found no convincing justification to support the continuation of separate field organizational titles, i.e, Missions, Office of USAID Representatives and USAID Affairs Offices. While the sizes of various organizations differ, both in staffing and program terms, the complexity of the responsibilities, and level of accountability of the managers does not substantially vary. While smaller posts tend to depend on other organizations, such as regional service/support organizations, for specific services, this is not always true and it does not lessen the accountability of the mission director serviced.

The ORIR findings support establishing one designation to be used in situations where an organization, with direct-hire staff, is established only to oversee long-term disaster programs in country. Examples: USAID Emergency Relief Coordinator, USAID Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator.

E. Disaster Relief Organizations

Currently, there are a number of countries where USAID presence, direct-hire or contract, is in place largely to monitor major USAID disaster relief programs. Some of these countries are Zaire, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia. Every disaster situation is different, and presently, there are no prescribed organizational approaches for dealing with them. The situation is further complicated when a need also exists to manage residual USAID development assistance programs or to plan for a new or reactivated development program but no regional bureau staff is present to carry out this responsibility. This presents quite a different situation from those countries where, when disaster strikes, there is an on-going development program and staff in place to support relief efforts. Assuming such a mission needs help, a BHR/OFDA DART or PSC can be sent out for short-term assistance. However, while in country, the DART/PSC usually works under the nominal guidance and direction of the local mission director or USAID Representative, even though the DART draws its resources (food aid and BHR/OFDA grants) and technical direction from the BHR. Further, the presence of a regional support organization nearby may also affect the organizational and staffing equation. If there is a regional services office nearby, that office can provide immediate assistance, even before a DART arrives, as REDSO did in Somalia in 1992, i.e., running the U.S. airlift from Kenya for the first ten days.

Concern with the respective roles of BHR and the regional bureaus is far less in those situations where a regular development program and presence exists in a country when disaster strikes. The addition of the BHR/OTI in the mix of organizational roles and responsibilities has added some confusion as well. While it was not the purpose of this study to address the programs undertaken by BHR/OTI, concerns were expressed by at least two bureaus interviewed about confusion

surrounding the questions of (1) where BHR/OTI will operate; (2) when BHR/OTI will launch its programs; and (3) the targets of BHR/OTI assistance versus the targets of the regional bureau transitional development programs. Questions were also raised about the feasibility of BHR/OTI having a budget beyond PD&S funds. At least in one case, the regional bureau understood from earlier announcements by the Administrator that the BHR/OTI group would essentially go into a country and quickly generate a plan for short term interventions (which the regional bureau would fund) as a transition to regular development status. This view was in contrast to having BHR/OTI go into a country and select a specific endeavor or activity and fund it. The function of BHR/OTI is clearly a matter requiring clarification.

The Agency needs to develop some basic understandings regarding the organizational responses to disaster situations in order to minimize confusion. Correspondingly, it is also critical to achieve an understanding with the IG with regard to the accountability standards applied to programs operating without in-country presence -- due to security or other restrictions.

Recommendations:

1. M/MPI should take the lead in a detailed review of the short and long-term effects of reengineering on the structure of program and project development and controller offices and identify opportunities for structural combinations between related technical disciplines.
2. The traditional USAID internal mission organizational structure should be reviewed by M/MPI at the end of the first year of operations under the reengineered systems to determine its continued validity.
3. In line with the reengineering principle of empowerment, Agency senior management should focus Washington's role on policy development, strategy development and direction, performance results reporting, resource allocation and field support; the field should be focussed on country strategic planning, implementation, program results monitoring and reporting, and evaluation.
4. M/MPI and regional bureaus should develop specific recommendations on the functions and role of regional services organizations, both short and long term, in the context of a reengineered USAID. Once the new suite of corporate data systems are in place Agency-wide, regional service organizations should conduct periodic reviews to determine whether allocation of workforce to supported missions justifies transfers of staff to serviced post, e.g., continuing need of 50% or more of a workyear of support will justify moving the position to the serviced post.
5. Regional services organizations should be required to adopt a formal, annual process for defining and programming the support services to be provided and to

develop a detailed travel and support schedule for the next twelve month period. Clients should participate fully in the development of such contracts, with information copies provided to Washington.

6. M/B and PPC need to identify and review programmatic and budget costs, deadlines and timeframes to determine if they need to be adjusted due to the perceived increase in time required to involve customers/partners on teams.

7. The Office of Procurement (M/OP) should issue procurement guidelines on conflicts of interest related to customer/partner participation on teams NLT October 1, 1995.

8. M/HR should provide assistance to missions to identify and plan prospective training programs to help customers/partners understand and adjust to the Agency reengineered processes.

9. M/MPI should secure the Administrator's approval to eliminate the USAID Representative and USAID Affairs Office organizational designations; utilize USAID Mission designation for all permanent field units.

10. M/MPI, in collaboration with BHR, should seek the Administrator's approval to establish a specific organizational designation, such as USAID Emergency Relief Coordinator or USAID Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator, for those cases where no traditional bilateral mission exists but where a direct hire disaster specialist is assigned to handle long term, complex disaster programs.

11. BHR/OTI should issue guidance clarifying where and when the BHR/OTI program would be mobilized and how it would differ from a normal transition to development program undertaken by a regional bureau.

12. BHR/OFDA should issue guidance regarding the roles to be assumed by BHR/OFDA staff in disaster program countries including those functions which they will not perform while present in a country, including:

- When a disaster strikes in a country where there is an on-going USAID program and staff, BHR/OFDA should provide an appropriately staffed DART or PSC(s). In these cases, no special organizational arrangements need be made. Regional services offices conveniently located should be expected to provide support, to the extent needs and capacity suggest, prior to the arrival of the BHR/OFDA DART or PSC(s) and during the time said staff is in place.

- In response to disaster situations, BHR/OFDA should field a DART team/PSCs which will be anticipated to be in place for a period NTE three to four months. A joint Regional Bureau/BHR assessment of the disaster situation

should be conducted at the end of three months to determine (1) whether the disaster support will predictably continue over a longer term period; and (2) whether a Regional Bureau direct-hire officer(s) needs to be assigned to manage the overall effort over the longer term.

- The DART team should not be charged with responsibility for management of residual development activities or planning for transitional development programs after the disaster situation abates.

VI. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Perhaps the single largest and most critical prerequisite to successful reengineering of the Agency is insuring appropriate and adequate training of its workforce. The expressed need for training was pervasive and not limited to that directly related to reengineering. The teams found general agreement in the field that training, across the board, is inadequate. To make matters worse, the decline in the number of experienced staff in the missions has meant less on-the-job training, often resulting in relatively inexperienced people occupying positions before they are sufficiently experienced and fully equipped to handle the responsibility.

That the problem of inadequate training was so universally noted reflects the lack of a coherent Agency training policy to insure that the essential operating skills needs of its employees are met. The teams heard repeatedly that employees at all levels lack training they deem necessary to fully perform their jobs. For a variety of reasons, they have been unable to avail themselves of this training, e. g., time or funding constraints, course unavailability, lack of information about courses offered and lack of management support. While it may be impossible to meet some of the very specialized training needs identified, what is underscored in the information the teams gathered is the need for training in the most fundamental skills. A majority of field staff and members of the ORIR teams clearly recognized the need for broad training of staff so that they can operate more effectively in today's operating environment, as well as to enable them to work with the reengineered systems and procedures.

Training needs detected through ORIR interviews can be broadly grouped into three categories: reengineering specific; cultural change and fundamental operating skills. USAID needs to address each category to insure successful implementation of reengineering.

A. Reengineering Specific

Technical Skills:

Maintaining and building technical skills becomes increasingly important if USAID staff are to have credibility with partners and be accepted on an equal footing. Technical officers regret the loss of the type of state-of-the-art courses which USAID offered in the past. They feel that the courses are needed to maintain a technical edge and, if they lose that edge, they will become less effective in the participation process and less relevant to the development process. Many technical officers feel that they are losing that edge, particularly since a large share of technical work is now being performed by contractors or there is greater reliance on other sources of analytical work.

They also strongly endorsed the value of periodic interface with professional counterparts, within and outside USAID, to help insure currency of skills, exchange ideas and lessons learned -- particularly important for the learning organization USAID aspires to become. Importantly, this need does not pertain only to USDH employees, but to FSNs as well.

Automation Technology:

With the heavy emphasis on automation applications and systems in reengineering, the field was concerned that the Agency not over-estimate its overall level of computer literacy. Computer skills will need to be upgraded across the board to get the most out of the reengineered operating systems. Not only is there a need for training in specific software packages, but many people are still uncomfortable with computers in general.

Business Area Specific Applications:

Field staff almost universally felt that "hands on" training in new systems and procedures will be necessary. In addition, they stressed that, whenever possible, training should be provided by functional specialists, e.g., financial management staff provide AWACS training.

A course structured similarly to the Project Implementation Course will be needed to train staff on implementation under the new operations system. A course of this type is considered ideal as it would provide exposure to key elements of four major reengineered business areas: budget, procurement, financial management and overall program operations.

Language Proficiency:

Language skills are critical if USAID staff is to be credible with its development partners and maintain a relevant role in development work. This need applies to both USDHs, in instances where skills are inadequate for conducting daily business and negotiations with host country counterparts, and for FSNs in instances where they are under-utilized because their English speaking and writing skills are weak.

Some of these same skills would be beneficial under the current operating system as well, but are seen as a necessity in support of reengineering.

B. Cultural Change

Employees also acknowledged that a significant change to the Agency culture will be required with reengineering. Cultural change is not something which will happen simply as a by-product of reengineering. It will take concerted effort and time to accomplish the adjustments. However, the process can be speeded and greatly enhanced by appropriate training which prepares the staff to work under different methodologies and systems and adapt more readily to those differences.

The core values of reengineering: teamwork, results-orientation, empowerment and accountability, and customer service, will shape not only the way our processes and systems operate, but also the evolution of USAID's operating culture. Changes in basic work methodologies and emphases under reengineering will require specific training in areas related to those values: team building, management and dynamics, cultural sensitivity, customer service methodologies, productive interaction with customers and partners, results-orientation, and performance benchmark development.

C. Fundamental Operating Skills

As mentioned above, training in a variety of essential operating skills was cited as inadequate. These skills are equally as important to the success of reengineering because they are the foundation for performing the basic work of the Agency. The more commonly mentioned ones follow:

- The need for training in management, supervisory and leadership skills is considered critical now, as it will continue to be under reengineering.
- The staff impressed on the teams the importance of good language, communication and interpersonal skills as well as cultural sensitivity. Teams were often told that while teamwork and working with their partners and customers was not new to field operations, these skills must be enhanced

under any operating circumstances.

- Many staff members expressed a continuing need for the sort of broad education in economic development models and process previously provided in the DSP course.

- Sufficient training in such areas as auditing and financial analysis are needed to maintain CPA certifications. NOTE: The Office of the Inspector General has a very good program for insuring that certifications are maintained.

D. Planning to Meet Training Needs

When USAID analyzes how to best address and meet these training needs, it will likely identify different methodologies such as instructor, computer modules, or videos, to reach the greatest number of staff in the most cost effective manner. Field staff asked that USAID/W bear in mind that, while videos and computer modules may reach more people at less cost, there are certain kinds of training where personal interaction is essential to success. Moreover, time pressures of daily work interfere far too easily with the best intentions to use computer modules and videos, rendering them, generally, less effective training techniques. Agency managers will likely need to establish opportunities for staff self-training, this is particularly true when videos and computer modules are the training mechanisms. This does not, however, exempt employees from their personal responsibility to arrange for, and acquire appropriate training.

The Agency is in a difficult situation regarding training. Because the Agency is behind the curve on meeting basic training needs in the field and is facing a massive training effort to implement reengineering, it must plan concurrent training to meet these needs and deal as well with easing itself into the accompanying culture change. The three broad training areas noted above are not mutually exclusive but are actually interconnected to a fairly substantial level. The approach USAID should take to meet these needs and allow for a successful implementation of the new systems should begin with:

- Wide-spread cross-training of the project and program staff in the basics of our core management support business specialties such as acquisitions, budgeting, and accounting. This will not only meet some of the needs for training currently required but also provide the basic understanding required by the shift to teams.

- Likewise, cross-training for controller, contracting and legal office staffs in general development and program implementation will better prepare them for their roles as members of strategic objective and results package teams.

- Training in basic automation technology, essential to use of the new operating systems.

This training must be augmented by management and leadership skills; team building, negotiation, participation and consensus building and language skills, interpersonal and communication skills as a requisite to teamwork, including customers and partners.

Further training will be required in strategic planning; customer service; performance, results measurement and monitoring; and program evaluation to enable the Agency to reorient itself to focus on results.

The field staff had the following suggestions in support of this endeavor, including support on a continuing basis:

- Specialized, situation-specific training in the Agency's new operating procedures, processes and systems should be made available to overseas organizations: (1) before and during implementation; (2) at posts abroad, to the extent possible; and (3) on a continuing basis for a prescribed period of time until the transition is completed and the new systems fully functional.

- To aid ongoing reengineering training, a referral service (hotline) for trouble-shooting of reengineering questions should be established, similar to a customer service function performed by many businesses. A second idea was to establish several teams to trouble-shoot specific problems in the field, as problems arise. A third idea was that USAID provide one to two years of systems expertise housed either in field missions or regional support missions, following the October 1, 1995 reengineering implementation date. The incumbent(s) of this position(s) would be available to teach staff, not just how the reengineered systems work, but how to use the systems and apply them in daily work, including the capacities and capabilities of the new corporate data base.

USAID is asking for a commitment on the part of its staff to implement and support Agency reform, and there is enthusiasm for the planned reforms. However, the Agency has been through reorganizations and small scale efforts that were supposed to "fix" whatever was deemed wrong, with little or no fundamental change resulting. A history of unproductive change is also part of the Agency's culture. Insuring that appropriate and timely training is provided to staff members is a golden opportunity for Agency management to reinforce its commitment to reform. Giving the employees the basic tools to do their jobs -- when they need those tools -- is a clear indication by senior management that they intend for reengineering to succeed.

Recommendations:

1. M/HR should prepare a plan for the timely training of all Agency personnel to address the identified deficiency in fundamental skills and meet the needs specific to reengineering and the accompanying culture change.
2. By October 1, 1995 and continuing over the long term, M/HR and the reengineering team design follow-up training to insure proper operation and use of the new systems. They should consider a multi-directional approach to providing some of the "hands on", ongoing training in new systems and procedures. For example:
 - establish a program whereby functional specialists provide training; and
 - establish several Washington based teams to provide short-term, trouble-shooting assistance; and
 - establish within each mission providing regional support, one position -- for a period not to exceed two years -- to provide ongoing systems expertise in the reengineered system. To some extent, this might also meet the need for a trouble-shooting capacity.
3. M/HR should provide intensive training in new systems before individuals depart Washington for an overseas assignment.
4. Managers overseas and in headquarters should be required to develop an individual training plan in conjunction with each employee, to guide staff development. M/HR should insure that the Agency managers' responsibility for insuring adequate staff training is included as a key element of the evaluation process.
5. The AA/M should name a central coordinator to manage all aspects of the training required during the roll-out of the new information system applications and the revised Agency business practices and processes.
6. M/HR should review the certification program existing in the IG for possible adaptation to USAID financial staff.
7. M/HR and the reengineering team should review the pros and cons of the full spectrum of training approaches, specific to the kind of training involved, to determine the most effective and economically methodology for individual training interventions.

VII. COMMUNICATIONS

The study teams cannot over-emphasize the importance of sharing even the most basic information with the field as soon as it is available. Information is critical to the speed and level of success of reengineering. While much information has been

disseminated to the field about separate aspects of reengineering and reform, it is generally fragmented information that allows little understanding of the totality. Much of the information that has been sent to the field, that has attempted to speak to the overall reform effort, has been so theoretical and conceptual in nature that many employees have had difficulty grappling with the real implications for change. Staff further noted that the reengineering reports produced to date are not user-friendly. The material is voluminous, complex and written in language that is not familiar to the vast majority of USAID staff. Consequently, even where it is available, the material is not necessarily being absorbed. In some cases, there is very little written information available, as in the case of AWACS. The controllers indicated that they are only familiar with the PIPE component of AWACS. Generally, staff felt that if more were known, they could better anticipate and prepare for the changes.

Agency management should intensify efforts to inform the field about reengineering initiatives and the operational changes envisioned. While much has been done -- such as cables, video tapes, printed reports, etc. -- additional opportunities to explain the nature of reform initiatives should be developed in an aggressive fashion. Further, it is suggested that a concerted effort be made to demonstrate linkages between the separate aspects of reform. Many explanations and descriptions of reforms, such as specific information system applications, tend to focus on narrow areas of concern, and it is not clear to the field that the various initiatives are parts of a cohesive, comprehensive whole.

There is an urgent need for some marketing tools for the reengineering products -- brief, clearly worded pieces which can be readily distributed and understood. Also, the field would welcome an information network on reengineering which shares the experiences of the experimental labs. Everyone in the Agency should be kept updated on the status of products being developed for each of the business areas. Without such a network, progress toward implementation of the new systems in FY 1996 will be that much more difficult.

Field staff feel that conflicting guidance -- guidance seemingly contrary to reengineering principles -- is being issued from Washington by the regional bureaus, Global, Management and PPC. Field missions trying to grasp and plan around reengineering concepts are extremely sensitive to receiving directives which they cannot reconcile with the direction and values of reengineering. Three examples since October, 1994 were brought to the attention of the teams: issuances on publications approvals; changing levels of grant approval authority to mission directors; and Washington approval of unsolicited proposals. Field staff are equally frustrated when they are told of reforms, yet observe no progress or improvement as a result. It is critical that Washington bureaus coordinate among themselves and with the reengineering team when issuing guidance. Moreover, Washington should seek field input, whenever practicable, before decisions directly affecting the field are made. In any case, the reasoning behind decisions must be transparent and widely

disseminated.

A lingering communication problem deals with the results of access to E-mail. Many indicated that it has greatly improved communication and enables more information sharing which will be important for the transparency reengineering hopes to achieve. Others noted, however, that E-mail has created a problem in determining when correspondence is official or even whether correspondence is from a contractor or direct-hire. Since cables are rarely used, it is often unclear when field action is required or when E-mail messages must be considered official business, printed, and placed in official files for reference and audit purposes.

Recommendations:

1. Drafting officers should insure that all written reinvention/reengineering materials are timely, user-friendly and provide as much detail as is available at time of issuance. Communications on specific systems should be explained in the context of the overall reengineering process.
2. The Quality Council should establish a mechanism to share experiences of the experimental missions with the rest of USAID.
3. As teamwork and empowerment principles demand, responsible Washington organizations should seek field input, to the extent practicable, before decisions directly affecting the field are made, and the reasoning behind decisions should be transparent and widely disseminated.
4. USAID/W must coordinate communications during the transition period so that they consistently reflect reengineering principles. Messages should not appear to be conflicting or contrary to reengineering. The Quality Council should serve a clearing-house function to accomplish this.
5. M/IRM should issue guidance regarding appropriate use of E-mail versus official Agency communications.

VIII. UNRESOLVED KEY EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN

Some of the field staff expressed the opinion that much of the change resulting from reengineering will require substantial adjustment in Washington behavior. They believe that the field is somewhat ahead of the curve, in large part, already focused on, and structured around, strategic objectives. Many were also unsure which would have greater impact on the Agency: reengineering or Congressional earmarks and resultant budget allocations, which have historically influenced USAID's programmatic framework. Many questions revolved around how the Agency will balance external

directions and constraints with strategic planning and performance management, including whether there is inherent conflict between the two.

There was almost universal concern expressed about the integrity of the accounting system when transactions are entered at the source, largely by non-financial personnel. Some staff emphasized that project officers often don't understand the consequences of their actions and will need guidance and support from the controller's office as well as specialized training.

A caution was often voiced that, when designing the reengineered systems and directives, the Agency should do what it can to actively insure that USAID operations are reasonably cost efficient. Examples given were (1) how many dollars in staff time are spent in clarifying minor discrepancies in funding, e.g., \$1000 -- too much "good" money going after too little "bad" money; and (2) the use of identical procedures to process a \$5 million contract action versus one for \$100,000.

The Agency needs to hold contractors accountable for their work. Many felt this to be a current problem but also believed that empowering staff at the lowest appropriate level and holding them accountable for results should help turn this problem around. Additionally, time savings anticipated with implementation of the new corporate data systems should provide more opportunity for contractor oversight.

The Agency must encourage and reward risk-taking by insuring the staff is confident, prepared, and willing -- through training, proper incentives, and organizational structure -- to take risks. The system needs to insure that risk-taking, even if the action is not fully successful, is seen by Agency management as a positive part of career development, not something punishable.

Discipline will be required Agency-wide, but particularly in Washington, to use the increased information and data properly, reducing reporting requirements and micro-management of the field.

Though October 1, 1995 has not yet arrived, the Agency needs to begin shedding non-critical parts of the old system --parallel operations are too burdensome. It will take time to change the Agency culture but, once reengineered systems and processes are understood and in use, the cultural changeover will accelerate.

Recommendations:

1. M/B should clarify how the Agency will balance the potential conflict between external priorities, i.e. Congressional targets and earmarks and USAID strategic planning and performance results.
2. Concurrent with designing the details of the reengineered systems, Washington

reengineering teams should identify those non-critical parts of existing systems which can be discontinued as soon as possible to reduce the burden of parallel operations.

IX. CLOSING SUMMARY

The level of enthusiasm for reengineering which the teams found in each mission in large part reflects the extent of knowledge each post has about it. Even in the most knowledgeable posts, thoughtful questions and legitimate concerns were raised about the details of implementation. For this reason, communications -- accurate, detailed, timely, user-friendly and reflective of the principles and direction of reengineering -- are essential to the success of reengineering.

The work of the Human Resources BAA team will be instrumental on many fronts to support reengineering. The core values of teamwork, empowerment, results orientation and customer service, represent fundamental cultural shifts in USAID's approach to development -- shifts that directly affect the personnel assignment, evaluation, incentives and rewards systems. The Human Resources BAA team must also address concerns specific to the relationship between Agency recruitment and PSC use; the enhanced role of FSNs and how to implement these changes; and the manner in which teams are formed, managed and evaluated. Addressing these concerns will go a long way in insuring the success of the reengineering process. To the extent possible, these concerns should be addressed prior to October 1, 1995.

The extensive training needs identified are critical because of resource availability and the time it will take to mount some training programs. Still, there is a great deal the Agency can do quickly to begin to meet those needs.

USAID will be reengineered; field staff are willing to do what is necessary to make it a success. But they cannot do it without consistent, appropriate, and continuing support from USAID Washington.

X. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

HUMAN RESOURCES

1. The BAA team for Human Resources should revamp the incentives, rewards, assignment and evaluation systems before October 1, 1995, to reflect the new team-oriented work style and managing for results.
2. At an appropriate point after implementation of the reengineered processes, M/HR should take the lead in collaborating with regional bureaus in verifying and quantifying the need for fewer secretaries, voucher examiners, accountants, C&R staff and PDOs. They should also verify and quantify the need for additional program/administrative assistants, financial analysts, data/information management specialists, systems analyst, performance results monitoring and evaluation specialists and contract officers as a result of reengineering.
3. The BAA team for Human Resources should review FSN authorities and compensation regulations to determine where increases are feasible, desirable and legal.
4. As part of the annual budget process, M/B should require each mission director to review staffing resources and certify that each USDH and USPSC position must be encumbered by an American.
5. Mission directors should be required to identify foreign national employees with the ability and potential to undertake more responsibility; to establish career ladder positions and identify training opportunities to enhance career development of FSNs.
6. M/HR should integrate the additional skills that will be required to function in the reengineered Agency into selection criteria for new hires.
7. The BAA team for Human Resources should address those barriers/constraints in the Agency's direct hire recruitment/assignment process that cause managers to resort to use of USPSC resources.
8. Following implementation of the reengineered systems, each mission should reassess the role of voucher examiners and project accountants and determine the

appropriate mix of skills required in the controller's offices if they are to effectively interface with strategic objective teams.

9. If a BHR/OFDA representative(s) has been placed in a country, without normal mission presence, to manage an emergency effort, after three to six months, BHR and the regional bureau should jointly review, the status of the disaster situation to determine if the need for disaster management will continue for a prolonged period of time. If it is determined that the need will be continuing, the appropriate regional bureau should assign a direct-hire bureau officer to manage the longer term effort, with appropriate support from BHR/OFDA. The senior USAID officer should be selected through the SMG process.

10. A regional bureau representative should be assigned as a member of the disaster DART teams whenever possible.

11. M/HR should revise promotion/assignment precepts to insure that USAID direct-hire officers do not continue to view assignments to disaster programs, whether in the field or in Washington, as being detrimental to their long-term career interests, as is currently the case.

12. Given the Agency's mission in "preventive diplomacy", M/HR should take those steps necessary to put in place a cadre of officers skilled in emergency program management.

13. To insure mission directors are clear with regard to resource requirements needed, M/IRM should communicate very clearly and directly to USAID principal officers what will be required in each field mission under ISP (LANS and PC configuration), what M/IRM is doing now to prepare the missions (planning and procurement), and what steps can now be taken in the field to prepare for the changes (introduce Windows,etc.).

ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT OF REENGINEERING

1. M/MPI should take the lead in a detailed review of the short and long-term effects of reengineering on the structure of program and project development and controller offices and identify opportunities for structural combinations between related technical disciplines.

2. The traditional USAID internal mission organizational structure should be reviewed by M/MPI at the end of the first year of operations under the reengineered systems to determine its continued validity.

3. In line with the reengineering principle of empowerment, Agency senior management should focus Washington's role on policy development, strategy

development and direction, performance results reporting, resource allocation and field support; the field should be focussed on country strategic planning, implementation, program results monitoring and reporting, and evaluation.

4. M/MPI and regional bureaus should develop specific recommendations on the functions and role of regional services organizations, both short and long term, in the context of a reengineered USAID. Once the new suite of corporate data systems are in place Agency-wide, regional service organizations should conduct periodic reviews to determine whether allocation of workforce to supported missions justifies transfers of staff to serviced post, e.g., continuing need of 50% or more of a workyear of support will justify moving the position to the serviced post.

5. Regional services organizations should be required to adopt a formal, annual process for defining and programming the support services to be provided and to develop a detailed travel and support schedule for the next twelve month period. Clients should participate fully in the development of such contracts, with information copies provided to Washington.

6. M/B and PPC need to identify and review programmatic and budget costs, deadlines and timeframes to determine if they need to be adjusted due to the perceived increase in time required to involve customers/partners on teams.

7. M/OP should issue procurement guidelines on conflicts of interest related to customer/partner participation on teams NLT October 1, 1995.

8. M/HR should provide assistance to missions to identify and plan prospective training programs to help customers/partners understand and adjust to the Agency reengineered processes.

9. M/MPI should secure the Administrator's approval to eliminate the USAID Representative and USAID Affairs Office organizational designations; utilize USAID Mission designation for all permanent field units.

10. M/MPI, in collaboration with BHR, should seek the Administrator's approval to establish a specific organizational designation, such as USAID Emergency Relief Coordinator or USAID Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator, for those cases where no traditional bilateral mission exists but where a direct hire disaster specialist is assigned to handle long term, complex disaster programs.

11. BHR/OTI should issue guidance clarifying where and when the BHR/OTI program would be mobilized and how it would differ from a normal transition to development program undertaken by a regional bureau.

12. BHR/OFDA should issue guidance regarding the roles to be assumed by

BHR/OFDA staff in disaster program countries including those functions which they will not perform while present in a country, including:

■ When a disaster strikes in a country where there is an on-going USAID program and staff, BHR/OFDA should provide an appropriately staffed DART or PSC(s). In these cases, no special organizational arrangements need be made. Regional services offices conveniently located should be expected to provide support, to the extent needs and capacity suggest, prior to the arrival of the BHR/OFDA DART or PSC(s) and during the time said staff is in place.

■ In response to disaster situations, BHR/OFDA should field a DART team/PSCs which will be anticipated to be in place for a period NTE three to four months. A joint Regional Bureau/BHR assessment of the disaster situation should be conducted at the end of three months to determine (1) whether the disaster support will predictably continue over a longer term period; and (2) whether a Regional Bureau direct-hire officer(s) needs to be assigned to manage the overall effort over the longer term.

■ The DART team should not be charged with responsibility for management of residual development activities or planning for transitional development programs after the disaster situation abates.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

1. M/HR should prepare a plan for the timely training of all Agency personnel to address the identified deficiency in fundamental skills and meet the needs specific to reengineering and the accompanying culture change.

2. By October 1, 1995 and continuing over the long term, M/HR and the reengineering team design follow-up training to insure proper operation and use of the new systems. They should consider a multi-directional approach to providing some of the "hands on", ongoing training in new systems and procedures. For example:

- establish a program whereby functional specialists provide training; and
- establish several Washington based teams to provide short-term, trouble-shooting assistance; and
- establish within each mission providing regional support, one position -- for a period not to exceed two years -- to provide ongoing systems expertise in the reengineered system. To some extent, this might also meet the need for a trouble-shooting capacity.

3. M/HR should provide intensive training in new systems before individuals depart

Washington for an overseas assignment.

4. Managers overseas and in headquarters should be required to develop an individual training plan in conjunction with each employee, to guide staff development. M/HR should insure that the Agency managers' responsibility for insuring adequate staff training is included as a key element of the evaluation process.

5. The AA/M should name a central coordinator to manage all aspects of the training required during the roll-out of the new information system applications and the revised Agency business practices and processes.

6. M/HR should review the certification program existing in the IG for possible adaptation to USAID financial staff.

7. M/HR and the reengineering team should review the pros and cons of the full spectrum of training approaches, specific to the kind of training involved, to determine the most effective and economically methodology for individual training interventions.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Drafting officers should insure that all written reinvention/reengineering materials are timely, user-friendly and provide as much detail as is available at time of issuance. Communications on specific systems should be explained in the context of the overall reengineering process.

2. The Quality Council should establish a mechanism to share experiences of the experimental missions with the rest of USAID.

3. As teamwork and empowerment principles demand, responsible Washington organizations should seek field input, to the extent practicable, before decisions directly affecting the field are made, and the reasoning behind decisions should be transparent and widely disseminated.

4. USAID/W must coordinate communications during the transition period so that they consistently reflect reengineering principles. Messages should not appear to be conflicting or contrary to reengineering. The Quality Council should serve a clearing-house function to accomplish this.

5. M/IRM should issue guidance regarding appropriate use of E-mail versus official Agency communications.

UNRESOLVED KEY ISSUES OF CONCERN

1. M/B should clarify how the Agency will balance the potential conflict between

external priorities, i.e. Congressional targets and earmarks and USAID strategic planning and performance results.

2. Concurrent with designing the details of the reengineered systems, Washington reengineering teams should identify those non-critical parts of existing systems which can be discontinued as soon as possible to reduce the burden of parallel operations.

STUDY PROPOSAL

OVERSEAS REINVENTION IMPACT REVIEW

Purpose: To develop a set of overseas organization and staffing models which when applied will result in more effective and streamlined organizations which reflect the results of the reengineering of our collective business systems and procedures.

Study Resources:

The work will be coordinated by the Director of the Office of Management Planning and Innovation (M/MPI) and will be carried out by three regional teams. Each team will be led by a senior member of the MPI staff and will be composed of a maximum of four officers as follows: Team Leader (MPI), Regional Bureau Representative, a G Bureau or BHR Representative as appropriate, and a staff analyst from MPI. Continued interface will be carried out with the Workforce Planning Staff of the Office of Human Resources.

Approach: The work will be carried out in the following sequence:

1. Selection of test sites: Using the Mission Workforce Model, wherein USAID posts are categorized according to type and complexity of country-specific project portfolios, two countries will be selected from each category of mission:

- i. Development program
- ii. Political/Security program
- iii. Advanced Developing Country program
- iv. Disaster Relief program

Potential test sites have been identified, per Attachment I to this memorandum. Note that a "Flux Factor" is utilized to determine which missions are candidates for the study; posts which are currently experiencing the least changes in their workforce and programming are considered to be the best candidates for an analysis of normal USAID business functions and practices.

For the same reason, ENI posts are not considered good candidates for this study; ENI is still in an aggressive growth mode and that, coupled with their "notwithstanding" operating authorities, serve to make it a rocky and problematic testbed and the lessons

learned would be difficult to extrapolate to other missions.

Attachment II distributes the candidate posts by geographic region for planning purposes and as a tool for organizing the implementation of the study.

2. Base data will be assembled, in Washington, concerning the selected countries. Base data will include: (1) Complete staffing patterns covering direct-hire U.S. and FSN and FSN, TCN and U.S. personal services contractors, PASAs, RSSAs, IPAs, etc.; (2) Aggregate program levels, including DA, DFA, ESF, P.L. 480, SAI, Freedom Support, etc. (3) Detailed project listing including pipeline; (4) Operating Expenses and Trust Fund data by major activity, including FAAS costs; (5) Strategic objectives; and (6) Country direction as viewed by the geographic bureau. Team members will work with M/HR, M/B, geographic bureaus and others, as appropriate, to quickly collect the data available on paper. Interviews will be employed to provide input on the planned direction of the geographic bureaus for each selected country. This information, together with the written data, will result in a profile of country specifics to complement the generic data gathered, and establish a current knowledge base from which to approach validation in the field.

3. Generic data will be assembled on the current functions and roles of the staff in these missions sufficient to allow a detailed comparison between current overseas business and "reengineered" business and work function prototypes. The data which is gathered will be based upon available documentation and on discussions with a wide variety of field staff currently located in Washington. Such data will include:

(1) detailed descriptions of the functions of each occupational category in the Mission, e.g., Controller, EXO, Project Development Officer, etc.;

(2) contextual description of role to be played (size of mission, complexity of programs, etc.);

(3) unique aspects of occupational functions that, by definition, must now be played in the field;

(4) country-specific, role-specific business functions, according to the unique operating environment that exists in each of the test site posts.

4. Current directions and detailed proposals resulting from the Operations, Procurement, AWACS and Budget Business Area Analyses will be assembled. The changes in how we conduct our business that are suggested by these analyses will form an overlay which will be applied to existing and current business practices. This

study will identify and measure the differences to assess impact.

5. Field site visits will be undertaken to develop a clear sense of how the Mission functions, further flesh-out and verify current roles and responsibilities of existing staff and to assess and validate the anticipated impact on the staff functions, skills requirements and workforce levels of the "reengineering proposals". Specific attention will be given to the impact of business reengineering on the various support functions, the appropriate mix of direct-hire and nondirect-hire resources, and the distribution of functional responsibilities between the field and Washington.

6. Results of findings and recommendations for a requisite number of models defined in terms of skills requirements and workforce levels will be reported.

7. Once approval of the recommended models is received, a time line for implementation will be developed.

Timing:

A draft study report will be provided to the AA for Management by November 30, 1994 and a final report will be available for Agency-wide circulation by December 31, 1994.

OPERATIONAL PLAN
FOR THE
OVERSEAS REINVENTION IMPACT REVIEW (ORIR)

1. PROBLEM: The results of Agency reengineering and the parallel reinvention work mandated by NPR are now apparent, and when published as Agency directives, the new business practices and procedures will change the manner in which field missions conduct their work. Implementation of these principles will require modification of personnel roles and operating procedures, and the extent of changes must be assessed and measured to determine impact. Models based upon the new and modified business practices must be developed to guide staffing and other resource allocation decisions.

2. HYPOTHESES: The study is based upon a single, initial hypothesis; several secondary hypotheses will suggest themselves during the course of the study.

The adoption of newly developed business practices through the introduction of a revised Agency directives system will significantly affect the manner in which USAID development assistance and administrative work is conducted overseas.

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: The dimensions of the study include organizational structure, staffing levels and configuration, skills mix, workflow, OE allocations and reporting responsibilities.

Key indicators will constitute the variables measured during the study, and they will consist of the discrete areas of change identified through consultation with the USAID Washington offices responsible for reform initiatives.

4. OPERATIONAL PLAN: The ORIR will consist of 3 studies, by geographic area. Each study will consist of three stages. Base data will be collected and analyzed during the first stage; the data will be validated and analyzed during the second stage; and the differences between existing and new business practices will be identified and measured during

the third and final stage. The initial study will focus on LAC countries: El Salvador, Panama, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay. The subsequent two studies will cover select posts in the AFR and ANE regions.

- A. Generic data will be collected on each post so that the core business of individual offices and select staff can be identified. MPI/MIC and MPI/MC share responsibility for the following data collection activities. The required data for the LAC study should be assembled for review on 08/29/94.

MC o ABS
 o CDSS
 o CP
 o M/HR/WPS Staffing Pattern

MIC o SPARs for all USDH positions
 o SOWs for all USPSC positions from M/OP
 o FMFIA reports
 o IG and GAO audit reports and status

- B. M/MPI staff meets with representatives of regional bureaus, M/HR/WPS, Global and BHR to review key indicators/variables and to form teams. The study teams then meet with representatives of BAAs for status briefing and to discuss changes suggested by reengineering work. The key indicators/variables (business practices and procedures, position responsibilities and roles) to be studied will be reviewed and refined in consultation with the BAAs during initial meetings. Teams for the LAC study formed by 09/02/94. Discussions with BAAs on key indicators completed by 10/12/94.
- C. Overseas data collection and validation for the LAC study carried out through onsite audit and verification. Overseas travel completed by 11/10/94.
- D. While the LAC overseas portion of the review is being conducted, MIC and MC staff in Washington begin compiling generic data to initiate the AFR and ANE studies. The required data should be assembled and ready for review on 11/10/94.
- E. Final data for the LAC study is organized for analysis and interpretation by the work teams. Interpretation of the data allows the development of conclusions and the assessment of implications. The completed, draft report is ready for the review of the Director, M/MPI by 11/30/94.

- F. M/MPI meets with the representatives of the AFR and ANE Bureaus to discuss study activities. Lessons learned from the initial LAC study are applied, and study teams meet with representatives of BAAS for consultation on indicators and preliminary interpretations of data. Discussions with BAAs completed by 01/05/95.
- G. Overseas data collection and validation carried out through onsite audit and verification. Overseas travel in Africa and Asia and Near East regions takes place simultaneously. Overseas travel completed by 01/31/95.
- H. Final data for the AFR and ANE studies is organized for review by the work teams. Interpretation of the data allows the development of conclusions and the assessment of implications. The completed draft reports are ready for the review of the Director, M/MPI by 02/17/95.
- I. ANE, AFR and LAC draft reports are compared and the information consolidated. Final report for the Overseas Reinvention Impact Review is prepared and presented to the AA/M by 02/28/95.

TEAM COMPOSITION

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN

Ron Olsen, Leader	M/MPI
Eric Zallman	LAC/SPM
James Bonner	G/EG
Barry Burnett	M/MPI
Sandra Malone-Gilmer	M/MPI
Susan M. Walls	M/MPI

ASIA/NEAR EAST

Sandra Malone-Gilmer, Leader	M/MPI
Barry MacDonald	ANE/RI
James Bonner	G/EG
Maribeth Zankowski	M/HR
Susan Brunner	M/MPI
Michael Rogal	M/MPI

AFRICA

Susan M. Walls, Leader	M/MPI
Alan V. Getson	AFR/SD
Pam White*	M/HR
Kyle Schooler	M/MPI
Alan Swan	BHR/M
Barry Burnett	M/MPI
Yvonne Gaines	M/B

*Team member for three of five sites visited.

(Used in LAC)

OVERSEAS REINVENTION IMPACT REVIEW
DATA COLLECTION FORM -- INTERVIEW

DATE: _____

EMPLOYEE: _____

POSITION: _____

EMPLOYEE TYPE: (USDH/FSN/USPSC/FNPSC)

WORK UNIT REVIEWED: (MISSION/OFFICE/INDIVIDUAL)

1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR MAJOR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2. DOES YOUR PERCEPTION OF YOUR ROLE DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT OF YOUR SUPERVISOR?
3. IN YOUR OPINION, HOW HAS YOUR POSITION CHANGED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS? HAS THE NATURE OF THE POSITION EVOLVED AS THE PROGRAM EMPHASIS HAS CHANGED? IF SO, IN WHAT WAYS?
4. ARE THERE AREAS OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITY WHICH YOU BELIEVE ARE NOT GIVEN SUFFICIENT ATTENTION DUE TO LACK OF AVAILABLE TIME? WHAT ASPECT OF YOUR WORK WOULD YOU SPEND MORE TIME ON -- OR EMPHASIZE -- IF YOU HAD ADDITIONAL TIME OR RESOURCES AT YOUR DISPOSAL?
5. ARE YOUR CURRENT SKILLS AND ABILITIES UTILIZED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE OVERSEAS? ARE YOUR CURRENT SKILLS AND PERSONAL INVENTORY OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCIES ADEQUATE TO ALLOW YOU TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR ASSIGNED DUTIES IN THE BEST MANNER POSSIBLE?
6. IF YOUR ANSWER TO ANY PART OF THE PREVIOUS QUESTION IS NO, WHAT TRAINING OR WORK EXPERIENCE WOULD BE BENEFICIAL OR NECESSARY?

7. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE WORK IS DISTRIBUTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO Insure ADEQUATE ACCOUNTABILITY?
8. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF WORK IN YOUR AREA OF SPECIALTY AMONG THE DIRECT-HIRES, USPSCS, FNDH, FNPSC, PASA/RSSA, ETC.
9. TO THE EXTENT YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE PLANNED AND ANTICIPATED CHANGES OCCURRING IN USAID PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES AS A RESULT OF THE REENGINEERED BUSINESS PRACTICES AND THE ADOPTION OF A NEW, CORPORATE DATA SYSTEM, HOW DO YOU THINK YOUR WORK WILL CHANGE AS A RESULT?
10. DO YOU HAVE THE SKILLS, WORK EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING NECESSARY TO ADOPT AND IMPLEMENT THE NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES AND PROCESSES? WHAT TRAINING OR WORK EXPERIENCE DO YOU BELIEVE WILL BE NECESSARY IN PREPARATION?
11. THE NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES BROADEN AND FORMALIZE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF WORK THROUGH TEAMS; HOW DO YOU BELIEVE THIS EMPHASIS WILL AFFECT YOU AND YOUR OFFICE?
12. ADP ENHANCEMENTS AND INCREASED UTILIZATION OF COMPUTER RESOURCES ARE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF REENGINEERING EFFORTS; HOW WILL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SINGLE AGENCY SYSTEM AND THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF RELIABLE, HIGH QUALITY DATA ON MISSION AND AGENCY OPERATIONS AFFECT YOUR WORK?
13. CUSTOMER SERVICE AND AN EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE AGENCY INTERACTS AND WORKS WITH CLIENTS IS ONE OF THE MAJOR THEMES IN AGENCY REFORM; HOW DO YOU ANTICIPATE YOUR WORK WITH PVOs, NGOs, INSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTORS AND HOST-GOVERNMENT ENTITIES WILL CHANGE, AS A RESULT?
14. GIVEN YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH USAID AND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT AGENCY PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES, DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER OBSERVATIONS OR COMMENTS REGARDING YOUR ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OR THE CHANGES THAT ARE ANTICIPATED?

(Used in ANE and AFR)

OVERSEAS REINVENTION IMPACT REVIEW

DATA COLLECTION FORM -- INTERVIEW

DATE: _____

EMPLOYEE: _____

POSITION: _____

COUNTRY: _____

EMPLOYEE TYPE: (USDH/FSN/USPSC/FNPSC)

1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR MAJOR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
2. WHAT CHANGES, IF ANY, HAVE YOU SEEN OR EXPERIENCED IN THE DEMANDS/RESPONSIBILITIES OF YOUR OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY DURING YOUR PERIOD OF SERVICE IN THIS CATEGORY? TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THESE CHANGES, E.G., SHIFTS IN PROGRAM EMPHASIS, RESOURCE LEVELS? IF CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED, ARE THEY REFLECTED IN YOUR POSITION DESCRIPTION?
3. ARE THERE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH YOU BELIEVE ARE NOT GIVEN SUFFICIENT ATTENTION? IF SO, WHAT PREVENTS YOU FROM DOING SO, E.G., TRAINING, TIME?
4. DO YOU POSSESS TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL SKILLS WHICH ARE NOT FULLY UTILIZED IN YOUR CURRENT POSITION? IS THERE ADDED TRAINING OR WORK EXPERIENCE YOU FEEL MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL TO YOU IN CARRYING OUT YOUR ASSIGNED DUTIES? HAVE YOU HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN THIS TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE?
5. ELEMENTS OF REENGINEERING ARE DESIGNED TO ASSIST IN IMPROVING INTERNAL CONTROLS. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE WORK IN YOUR OFFICE AND IN THE MISSION IS CURRENTLY STRUCTURED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE ADEQUATE MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, E.G., PROGRAM AND OE FUNDS UTILIZED APPROPRIATELY, RESOURCES NOT ABUSED OR MISUSED, AND AGENCY PROPERTY PROPERLY ACCOUNTED FOR?

6. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF WORK IN YOUR AREA OF SPECIALTY AMONG THE DIRECT-HIRES, USPSCS, FNDH, FNPSC, PASA/RSSA, ETC.? ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF WORK BETWEEN OFFICES IN THE MISSION? IF PROBLEMS EXIST, TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THEM?
7. TO THE EXTENT YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE UPCOMING CHANGES IN USAID PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES THAT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH REENGINEERED BUSINESS PRACTICES, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SINGLE AGENCY SYSTEM, AND THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF RELIABLE, HIGH QUALITY DATA ON MISSION AND AGENCY OPERATIONS, WHAT CHANGES DO YOU FORESEE IN HOW YOU CARRY OUT YOUR WORK?
8. WHAT SPECIFIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OR WORK EXPERIENCE DO YOU BELIEVE WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO ADOPT AND IMPLEMENT THE NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES AND PROCESSES?
9. WHAT SKILLS AND WORK EXPERIENCE SHOULD THE AGENCY REQUIRE WHEN ESTABLISHING POSITIONS AND RECRUITING NEW EMPLOYEES IN YOUR OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY? WHAT ESSENTIAL SKILLS DO YOU BELIEVE WILL BE EMPHASIZED IN YOUR OFFICE/MISSION IN THE FUTURE?
10. COULD THE MISSION AND/OR YOUR OFFICE BE ORGANIZED DIFFERENTLY TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF OPERATIONS WHEN THE NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES ARE IMPLEMENTED? DO YOU BELIEVE THERE WILL BE SPECIFIC WORK THAT WOULD BE BETTER PERFORMED EITHER IN THE FIELD, IN WASHINGTON OR IN ANOTHER MISSION?
11. THE NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES BROADEN AND FORMALIZE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF WORK THROUGH TEAMS INCLUDING REPRESENTATION FROM CUSTOMERS AND PARTNERS OUTSIDE THE MISSION. HOW DO YOU BELIEVE THIS EMPHASIS WILL IMPACT YOU AND YOUR OFFICE? WHAT POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS OR BENEFITS DO YOU ENVISION?
12. CUSTOMER SERVICE AND AN EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE AGENCY INTERACTS AND WORKS WITH CUSTOMERS IS ONE OF THE MAJOR THEMES IN AGENCY REFORM; HOW DO YOU ANTICIPATE YOUR WORK WITH PVOs, NGOs, INSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTORS, END-USERS AND HOST-GOVERNMENT ENTITIES WILL CHANGE, AS A RESULT?
13. WHEN THE NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES AND COMPUTER INFORMATION SYSTEMS ARE IMPLEMENTED, SOME TIME SAVINGS ANTICIPATED CAN BE USED TO PERFORM ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT WORK AS DISCUSSED EARLIER. HOW MANY AND WHAT TYPES OF POSITIONS AND/OR ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS DO YOU ANTICIPATE MIGHT BE AFFECTED AND IN WHAT WAYS, E.G., RETRAINED, REDUCED, COMBINED OR ELIMINATED?

14. GIVEN YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH USAID AND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT AGENCY PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES, DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER OBSERVATIONS OR COMMENTS REGARDING YOUR ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OR THE CHANGES THAT ARE ANTICIPATED?

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ANE REPORT
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AFR REPORT
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